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Eminent Domain: A Legislative Proposal for the
Reimbursement of Condemnees' Attorney's Fees
Society's ever increasing need for transportation facilities and electrical
power, and our rapidly growing consumption of other natural resources, is
now, more than ever before, necessitating the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain by state and federal governments and by other authorized par-
ties.' Both the United States and Indiana constitutions condition the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by providing that the condemnee must
receive "just compensation" for his land.2 Yet it has long been helai that this
guarantee does not compel the reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred by
the landowner in condemnation proceedings. This interpretation is hard to
justify since the policy behind the "just compensation" clauses is to insure that
the landowner is made whole.
3
Recent studies reveal that abusive negotiation tactics are being utilized by
condemnors, or their agents, in an effort to obtain property at less than fair
market prices. 4 The condemnee is thus forced to incur substantial attorney's
fees to secure a judicial determination of a fair amount. In light of the dif-
ficulty of convincing the courts to re-evaluate their long-standing construction
of the "just compensation" clauses, the duty rests with the legislatures to pro-
vide relief for condemnees by equalizing the relative economic positions of,the
condemnor and condemnee. While some legislatures have responded to the
need for reform, the solutions adopted to date either fall short of making the
landowner whole in every case or leave gaps allowing condemnors to persist in
their current practices. It is submitted that the only effective solution is to
allow the condemnee to recover his attorney's fees from the condemnor in
'For an example of corporations hormally given the power of eminent domain, See IND.
CODE § 32-11-3-1 (1976).
2"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
"No man's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case
of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered." IND. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
'The meaning of the term "just compensation" has been the source of much scholarly
writing. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS. CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL
PRACTICE (1961); 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6 (rev. 3d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS']; Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining 'ust Compensation,"
21 STAN. L. REv. 693 (1969); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sheppard,
Compensation in Florida Condemnation Proceedings, 14 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 28 (1962); Note, At-
torney's Fees as an Element of Just Compensation, 12 IOWA L. REv. 286 (1927).
4See; e.g., Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County: An Empirical Look into the Practices of
Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 430 (1967); State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799
(1973) (Arterburn, C.J. dissenting); PRACTISING LAW INSTrrTUTE, REAL ESTATE CONDEMNATION
105 (1976); note 3 supra. For a discussion of the need for reform, see notes 39-67 infra.
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every case where the judicially determined "just compensation" exceeds the
condemnor's final offer before trial.
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS To DETERMINE "JUST COMPENSATION"
The Statutory Approach to Determining 'Just Compensation"
Familiarity with the typical condemnation proceeding is essential to an
understanding of the problem. Since the procedure followed in Indiana is
similar to that of most other states, and also to federal practice, 5 it will be us-
ed as a reference from which to approach a solution.
6
Before initiating a condemnation proceeding the condemnor is required
to make an effort to purchase the property. 7 If a suitable price cannot be
agreed upon, the condemnor must institute a suit to condemn the property. s
Thereupon the court will appoint three appraisers to determine the fair
market value of the property to be taken and also any damages sustained and
benefits realized by the condemnee. 9 At this point either party can except to
the appraisal and demand a trial by jury.10 Regardless of which party excepts
to the appraisal, the condmnee has the burden of proving the fair market
value of the property appropriated." Within this setting the condemnee will
incur substantial attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in order to
determine the just compensation he is entitled to receive for his property.
The determination of just compensation is a judicial, rather than a
legislative, function. 12 The question of the necessity of the appropriation,
however, is deemed to be a legislative, or political, question which will not be
reviewed by the courts.13 As a result, the landowner facing a condemnation
proceeding has little hope of successfully challenging the physical taking of
'See Federal Declaration of Taking Act of 1931, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-258e (1970); FED. R.
Civ. P. 71A.
'For an excellent treatment of the Indiana law on eminent domain see INDIANA CONTINU.
ING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM. EMINENT DOMAIN IN INDIANA (1976).
7IND. CODE § 32-11-1-1 (1976).
'IND. CODE § 32-11-1-2 (1976).
OIND. CODE § 32-11-1-4 (1976).
"CIND. CODE § 32-11-1-8 (1976).
"Van Sickle v. Kokomo Water Works Co., 239 Ind. 612, 616, 158 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1959);
27 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 419 (1966).
"Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923); Monongahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 304, 315 (1795); United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 (1892), the Court said:
The legislature may determine what private property is needed for public pur-
poses-that is a question of a political and legislative character; but when the taking
has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial.... The Constitution
has declared that just compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a
judicial inquiry.
Id. at 327.
"Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
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his property and is left only with the constitutional promise of receiving just
compensation for the land taken.
The just compensation guaranteed to the condemnee "must be a full and
perfect equivalent for the property taken. " 14 This has been construed to mean
"substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as
he would have been if his property had not been taken."' 15 To comply with
this requirement the courts consistently use the concept of "fair market value"
to determine the appropriate compensation. 16 This is commonly defined as
"what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.'
' 7
The Constitutional Guarantee of 'just Compensation"
It has long been held that the just compensation guarantee of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution does not require that the con-
demnee be reimbursed for his attorney's fees.' 8 This is based upon the ra-
tionale that "this just compensation . .. is for the property, and not to the
owner."' 9 But some state courts have reached the opposite construction of the
same phrase.in their state constitutions,2" and their reasoning is persuasive:
14Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
"Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923). See also United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); State v. Reid, 204 Ind. 631, 185 N.E.449 (1933); Schnull v. In-
dianapolis Union Ry., 190 Ind. 572, 131 N.E. 51 (1921).
"United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913); Alberson
Cemetery Ass'n v. Fuhrer, 192 Ind. 606, 613, 137 N.E. 545, 547 (1923); 4 NIcHOLs' supra note 3,
§ 12.2.
"7United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
"8E.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930); United States v. 100 Acres of Land,
468 F.2d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); United States v. 2353.28
Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 158 F.
Supp. 122, 125 (M.D. Pa. 1957); United States v. 251.81 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 81, 83
(W.D. Ky. 1943).
In Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930), it was said: "Attorneys' fees and expenses are
not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain. See Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
City of Providence, supra, [262 U.S. 668], 675." Id. at 368. It is submitted thatJoslin is not
authority for such a holding. The issue presented inJoslin, as it bears upon just compensation,
was whether injury to a business conducted upon propertb taken for public use constituted an
element of just compensation. The Supreme Court held that it did not. An analysis of the Court's
opinion does not lead to the conclusion, or even the inference, that attorney's fees are not an ele-
ment of just compensation. Nevertheless, Dohany has repeatedly been cited as authority for such
a holding and seems to be so firmly entrenched as a precedent that it probably could not be suc-
cessfully challenged.
"Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). For a discussion
of this "res" concept, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND AP-
PRAISAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION 4-7 (1969) (hereinafter cited as A.L.I. & A.B.A. GUIDE].
2Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958);
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel & Drum Co., 110 N.J. Super. 506, 266 A.2d
164 (1970). In Du Pree the Florida Supreme Court held that the condemnee is entitled to reim-
bursement for his attorney's fees under the Florida Constitution, saying:
This court is committed to the doctrine that attorney's fees amy be awarded only
in cases where statute or special contract provides for them. This is the general rule
1977]
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Under present-day conditions the traditional approach of requiring a
condemnee, in all cases, to bear the expense of legal fee' and expert witnesses
is inequitable and an unfair burden placed upon the landowner. We are
mindful that the condemnee is in a far different position than the average
defendant. If the average defendant is in court, it is usually because he has
committed an act of commission or omission. A condemnee becomes a
litigant merely because he owns land that the sovereign wishes to acquire.
The sovereign must pay just compensation for such land. Does a condemnee
receive just compensation or is he "made whole" if he must expend large
sums of money to insure that he gets a fair price for his land? We think
not.
21
Indiana courts have construed article I, sec. 21, of the Indiana Constitu-
tion in a manner similar to the United States Supreme Court's construction of
the fifth amendment. 22 The leading case is State v. Holder, 23 where the State
of Indiana filed a complaint to condemn property owned by Holder in order
that the state might construct a highway.2 4 The court, with no objection by
the condemnee, appropriated the land and appointed appraisers. The state
filed exceptions to the amount found by the appraisers and demanded a trial
by jury on the amount of damages. One day before the trial was to com-
mence the state made a motion to withdraw its exceptions; the motion was
granted. The trial court, however, ordered the state to pay $500 in attorney's
fees and $100 for professional witness and trial preparation fees to the con-
demnee. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, over a vigorous dissent by
Mr. Chief Justice Arterburn. 25 The court, while not expressly addressing the
constitutional definition of "just compensation,"'2 6 held that although Indiana
applicable in cases involving private litigation. Without, as we now feefl appropriate
consideration of the distinct nature of eminent domain proceedings and the stark
significance of the requirements of "full" and "just" compensation, this rule was ap-
plied to such proceedings. However, it is our opinion that an exception should be
made to the general rule in those cases wherein appellees in eminent domain pro-
ceedings are successful in defending appeals prosecuted by the condemning authority.
We believe such an exception is in keeping with the spirit and letter of our con-
stitutional provision for full or just compensation. . ..
Failure to recognize such an exception in a case like the instant suit would fall far
short of "a practical attempt to make the owner whole."
108 So. 2d at 294 (footnotes and citations omitted).
2"New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel & Drum Co., 110 N.J. Super. 506,
511, 266 A.2d 164, 166 (1970).
22Harding v. State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources, - Ind. App. 3 557 N.E.2d
149 (1975); Honey Creek Corp. v. WNC Development Co., - Ind. App. -' 331 N.E.2d
452 (1975); State v. Palmwic Indiana Realty, Inc., - Ind. App. -_, 297 N.E.2d 479 (1973).
See State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799 (1973).
21260 Ind. 336, 995 N.E.2d 799 (1973).
2"Where the State of Indiana, or an agency thereof, seeks to appropriate property for the
construction or maintenance of a highway, the condemnor, contrary to the normal procedure,
see IND. CODE 32-11-1-1 (1976), is not required to make an initial offer to purchase. See IND.
CODE 32-11-1-9 (1976).
"sSee notes 32-35 infra & text accompanying.
2"Even though the majority in Holder did not specifically hold that attorney's fees are not
an element of just compensation, the reasoning therein inescapably leads to that conclusion. It
[Vol. 52:813
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statutes provide that the condemnor shall pay all costs of an eminent domain
proceeding,27 the term "costs' encompasses neither attorney's fees2 8 nor those
of expert witnesses.2 9 In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Prentice rejected
the condemnee's contention that the allowance of attorney's fees and witness'
fees was permissible under Indiana Trial Rule 41 (A)(2)30 since the expenses
of litigation would not have been recoverable had the cause proceeded to
trial.
3'
Mr. Chief Justice Arterburn, dissenting vehemently, did address the con-
stitutional issue, and additionally, opined that these awards were proper
under Trial Rule 41 (A)(2):
As it is applicable to condemnation cases, as well as general civil litigation,
this Rule may be employed to implement the Constitutional clause [Article I,
sec. 21, of the Indiana Constitution] which specifically requires just compen-
sation when land is taken for public use ...
In my opinion, the Indiana Constitution means what it says. "Just com-
pensation" is making one whole for what is taken from him by the State's ac-
tion.
32
After acknowledging the common law rule that attorney's fees are generally
not recoverable as part of the damages in a lawsuit, 33 the Chief Justice ad-
monished this country for refusing to "sever the ties of antiquity even though
many courts have cried out against the injustice of failing to fully compensate
seems likely-that this was the Court's intention and that the matter was considered since the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Arterburn did address that issue. But whether intended or
not, Holder has been interpreted and cited as holding that attorney's fees are not a constitutional
element of just compensation. See Harding v. State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources, -
Ind. App. -, 337 N.E.2d 149, 150 (1975); State v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495, 497 n.l, 221
N.W.2d 106, 107 n.1 (1974) (construing a similar provision of the Minnesota Constitution).
2"The costs of the proceedings shall be paid by the plaintiff [condemnor], except that in
case of contest, the additional costs thereby caused shall be paid as the court shall adjudge." IND.
CODE § 32-11-1-10 (1976).
28State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 356, 539, 295 N.E.2d 799, 800 (1973).
217d. at 339, 295 N.E.2d at 801.
"IND. R. TRIAL P.41 (A)(2), provides in part: "except as provided in subsection (1)"... an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."
31State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 336, 348-49, 295 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1973).
32d. at 341, 295 N.E.2d at 802 (citations omitted).
31. the Unted States' is the -only country in the world that follows the so-called
"American Rule" that a litigant must bear the cost of attorney's fees incurred to -assert his legal
rights. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792,
792 (1966).. See C. McCoRMuIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 61 (1935). That the
courts' modern justifications for adhereiice to this rule are of questionable validity suggests that
they are being guided more by precedent than sound analytical reasoning. See, e.g., Alyeska
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 306 U.S. 714 (1967).
The underpinnings of the American Rule are becoming increasingly weakened by the attack of
legal writers. See, e.g., Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARv. L. REv. 849 (1975); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. Rxv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation, 49 IowA L.
REv. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New
Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1972); Posner, An
1977]
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condemnees incurring substantial expense in defending themselves or their
property. " 3 4 The dissenting opinion concluded with a review of abusive tactics
practiced by many condemnors and the need for allowance of attorney's fees
in order to comply with constitutional guarantees.
35
Thus, despite persuasive arguments to the contrary, most courts continue
to hold that attorney's fees are not recoverable as an element of just compen-
sation, but are allowable only where specifically authorized by statute. 3 6 It
would seem that these constitutional provisions, and the purpose for which
they were drafted into the constitutions, would lead to a contrary conclusion.
Even if the compensation to be given is for the property and not to the
owner, 37 such compensation is not in fact given when the condemnee must in-
cur attorney's fees to arrive at that amount. The basic purpose of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 21, of the
Indiana Constitution is to make the condemnee whole when his property is
appropriated for public use .3 The individual landowner should not be forced
to bear any of the burden of the cost of the land to be used for the public
benefit. Yet that is precisely what he must do when the condemnor adheres to
an offer that is less than the fair market value of his property, necessitating
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure andjudicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973);
Stoobuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966);
Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv.
129 (1974); Note, Allowance of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action is Not
Based on a Statute Providing for an Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 405 (1972); Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967); 46 MINN. L.
REv. 645 (1962). _
For a review of the development and background of the American Rule, see Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 640-44
(1974).
"State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 336, 342, 295 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1973).35
1d. at 343-48, 295 N.E.2d at 804-06. As Mr. Chief Justice Arterburn stated:
As judges, we are not unaware of the abuse of condemnation proceedings hy a
state by long drawn out litigation and delays ...
• . . Here the state sought the condemnees' property. . . . Instead of accepting
those determinations of the independent appraisers, the government filed objections
and proceeded to play cat and mouse with the condemnees. . . . Under these cir-
cumstances, if the condemnees are not allowed to recover these expenses, can it
honestly be contended that they have received just compensation under the Constitu-
tion? I think not.
Id. at 346-48, 295 N.E.2d at 805-06 (citations omitted).
USee, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967,
(trademark infringement case); Paterson v. City of Eufaula, Alabama, 330 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1964); State v. Holder, 260 Ind. 336, 295 N.E.2d 799 (1973); Honey Creek Corp. v. WNC
Development Co., - Ind. App. -, 331 N.E.2d 452 (1975); State v. Carter, 300 Minn. 495
221 N.W.2d 106 (1974). See also 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 386 (1965); 26 A.L.R.2d 129!
(1952).
"See note 19 supra & text accompanying.
5
Aswesaidin Stolzev. Milwaukee & L.W.R., 113 Wis. 44,88 N.W. 919(1902):
It cannot have been the purpose of the framers of the constitution that a person com-
pelled to surrender his property for public uses shall have any less as compensation
therefor than a full equivalent, measured by all reasonable rules. That must include
all necessary expenses incurred by him in the enforcement of his rights. ...
Id. at 59, 88 N.W. at 924.
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recourse to the courts and often an expensive trial by jury to insure that he
will receive the full value for his land. Since the condemnee must then pay
out a substantial portion of his judicially determined "just compensation" in
attorney's fees and expert witness fees it cannot be said that in the end he is
"made whole" for what was taken from him. The United States and Indiana
Constitutions should be construed to provide for no less.
It is sometimes asserted that to allow the condemnee to recover his at-
torney's fees would pose a risk to the "public treasury." But this argument is
also inadequate to justify withholding the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation from the landowner. Since it is for the public benefit that his
property is being taken, the "public treasury" should bear the full cost of that
benefit.
EMINENT DOMAIN: ABUSES AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Abuse of the Eminent Domain Power
An examination of current procedures followed by condemnors in emi-
nent domain proceedings demonstrates the need for relief for landowners. A
few years ago a revealing study was conducted of the condemnation process of
Nassau County, New York. 39 Under the practices followed, the negotiator
who represented the county in price discussions with the landowners was
limited in authority to a certain fraction of the county's own appraisal.40 The
"'Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County: An Empirical Look into the Practices of Condem-
nation, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 430 (1967). The study was conducted in 1964.
401d. at 433. The County's appraisal procedures are especially revealing. Appraisers were
selected from a list of "fixed fee appraisers" who were paid based upon the frontage of the pro-
perty taken. No consideration was given to the character of the property, time used in making
inspections, or the complexity involved in determining the value of the land to be appropriated.
Such work is profitable only on a volume practice. Id. at 438. That such a procedure is of ques-
tionale accuracy is supported by the County's own policy of departing from it where the taking
was substantial or complicated. In such cases, an outside appraiser, taken from a second list, is
used and he receives a fee far above the "fixed fee appraiser." Id. at 439.
That this 'type of practice is not unusual is shown by the chart below which discloses the
losses suffered by some condemnees where the local board of education took their property for
the expansion of an elementary school. Note particularly the disparity between the board's own
appraisal and the offers that were made to the condemnees.
Gain or
Loss
Board of Letter Net to over
Plaintiff- Education of Judgment Attorney Appraisal Home- original
Owner Appraisal Offer Order Fees Cost owner Appraisal
Ashley $20,500 $16,000 $20,500 $ 900.00 $100.00 $19,500 - $1,000.00
Cold 16,500 13,500 17,500 800.00 100.00 16,600 + 100.00
Hill 17,750 13,600 18,000 880.00 100.00 17,020 - 730.00
Kampe 15,000 11,500 16,000 900.00 100.00 15,000
Lawson 16,500 13,000 17,000 800.00 100.00 15,600 - 900.00
Rhodes 17,000 11,500 17,500 1,200.00 100.00 16,200 - 800.00
Rogers 21,000 16,000 22,000 1,200.00 100.00 20,700 - 300.00
Thomas 18,500 15,000 20,000 1,000.00 100.00 18,900 + 400.00
Wilson 16,000 14,000 17,000 600.00 100.00 16,300 + 300.00
Rhodes v. City of Chicago, 516 F.2d 1373, 1376 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975).
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investigators determined that this fraction ranged from 60 to 85 percent of
the county's appraisal. 4' There was also evidence that the negotiator was en-
couraged to attempt a settlement below even the authorized percentage; 42 oc-
casionally, the tentative settlement secured by the negotiator was so uncons-
cionably low that the county representative ordered further price discus-
sions.
4 3
The results of the county's practices demonstrates the unjust financial
hardship upon the landowners. Where the negotiations resulted in a settle-
ment agreement, only 15.7 percent of the condemnees received an amount
equal to or greater than the county's low appraisal. 44 Of the remainder, 56.9
percent received less than 50 percent of the low appraisal. 45 The investigators
attributed these surprising results to the amicable rapport initially established
between the negotiators and the condemnees, 46 the lack of knowledge and ex-
perience on the part of the condemnee, and the financial burden of often
having to vacate the premises and obtain substitute housing even before price
negotiations on the old property had begun. 47 The inherent unfairness of the
county's condemnation procedures is further emphasized by the fact that 84.7
percent of the condemnees who pursued their cases to trial received or bet-
tered the county's low appraisal.
48
The inequity inflicted upon the landowners in Nassau County is not an
isolated situation. In Senate hearings on a proposed bill that would have
allowed the recovery of attnrney's fees in federal condemnation cases49 similar
4'Berger & Rohan, supra note 39, at 445.
4 Id.
"Id. at 434 n.15.4 1d. at 442. The term "low appraisal" is used to connote the lesser of the two appraisals
described on note 40 supra.
41Id. at 443.
4"Under the procedure followed, often the first contact the condemnee had with the
negotiator was to work out the complexities of the forms required to be completed by the con-
demnee. The investigators believe that this initial relationship influenced their later price
negotiations. Id. at 444.
"Id. at 444-47. The statutes in force at the time provided for a "quick-taking" process
whereby title vests in the County immediately upon the order of condemnation. This could occur
long before any price discussion was begun with the condemnee.
4'Id. at 450. Anticipating that readers of their article might skeptically believe that the
xesults of the Nassau County study were atypical, Professors Berger and Rohan compared their
findings with those of a study conducted by the Corps of Engineers of its federal land acquisition
proceedings. The latter study revealed that 83% of the property acquired was obtained by
negotiated settlement, and that one-fifth of the condemnees received less than the Corps' ap-
praisal. Id. at 458 n.60, citing Hearings on Real Property Acquisition Practices and Adequacy of
Compensation in Federal and Federally Assisted Programs Before the Select Subcomm. on Real
Property Acquisition of the House Comm. on Public Works, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 368-81, 383-90
(1963).
"Hearings on S.1351 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
S.1351]:
This bill would provide for the payment, under certain circumstances, of
reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney's fees to defendants in actions by the United
States for the condemnation of real property. The bill contemplates that reimburse-
[Vol. 52:813
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abuses were revealed. One case was reported where a federal agency
repeatedly dismissed a condemnation proceeding after judicial determination
of "just compensation," forcing the landowner to incur repeated litigation ex-
penses.50 The statements and testimony of several attorneys disclosed many in-
stances where the landowner received far more at trial than was offerd by the
condemnor,5 1 and those who had represented condemnees emphasized the
hardship suffered by landowners who fought to receive fair compensation. 2
The appraisal of property is not an exact science. It is based upon the
opinion, experience, and expertise of the individual appraiser. Naturally, dif-
ferences of opinion with respect to value will occur. In addition, an appraiser
in a condemnation case is often confined by guidelines imposed by the con-
demning authority and legal doctrines as to valuation.5 3 The investigations
which have been conducted, however, have illustrated a disparity between in-
itial offers and final court awards which exceed any acceptable variation in
appraisals.
In the past few months the Eminent Domain Study Committee of the In-
diana Legislative Council has been conducting meetings to gather informa-
tion and formulate policies leading to a revision of Indiana eminent domain
laws. The minutes of those meetings provide a graphic account of the nature
of current condemnation practices followed in Indiana.5 4 Consistent with the
investigations discussed above, the Indiana group found that most problems
occurred in the negotiation stage of condemnation proceedings. 55 Many lan-
downers complained about the behavior and tactics of the persons conducting
the negotiations.5 " Indeed, one landowner reported acts of violence allegedly
ment will be paid in cases where the amount of the judgment in favor of the property
owner exceeds the amount of the offer made to the property owner by the United
States prior to the litigation. It also contemplates reimbursing expenses in those cases
where the condemnation action is abandoned by the United States.
Id. at 1.
501d. at 8 (statement of Senator Wayne Morse).
511d. at 36, 40, 52-53. In one case the landowner was initially offered $350 for the property
to be taken by the federal government. This was increased to $5,800 just before trial. At trial the
condemnee received $88,319.51 for the property. But to receive this award the owner had to ex-
pend $25,921.12 in litigation costs, including $18,879.44 for attorney's fees. Thus, the con-
demnee actually received $62,398.39 for the property or, alternatively, 70.6 percent of the
judicially determined "just compensation." Id. at 53 (letter of Roland Boyd).
5 See Hearings on S.1351, supra notc -10.
5 Foerster, A Look at Condemnation Attorneys' Fees, 46 FLA. -B.J. -1*o, 1-3L 1972): "[T]he
appraiser often finds himself in a dilemma caused either by conflicting legal opinion or xnt..
jpretation of court cases, or by a request for an opinion of value or damages based on unrealistic
conditions and circumstances." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL INSTITUTES. CONDEMNATION.
COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS 31 (1969). See also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE AP-
PRAISERS. CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL PRACTICE (1961); A.L.I. & A.B.A. GUIDE. supra note 19.
54
See generally Minutes of the Meetings of the Eminent Domain Study Committee of the
Indiana Legislative Council (1976) [hereinafter cited as Minutes of (date)] [on file at the INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL].
"Suggested Legislation of the Eminent Domain Study Committee of the Indiana Legislative
Council (1976) [hereinafter cited as Suggested Legislation] [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
56E.g., Minutes of July 27, 1976, supra note 54, at 2-3; Minutes of July 13, 1976, supra
note 54, at 2-4; Minutes of June 8, 1976, supra note 54, at 4-5 (letter of John S. Pouch).
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caused by the condemnor having turned the community against him, and in-
timated that the death of two elderly condemnees of heart attacks may have
been accelerated by the harrassing tactics of the condemnors.5 7
The testimony of representatives of Indiana condemnors, particularly
public utilities, provides a descriptive portrayal of the procedure routinely
followed in acquiring property. Many condemnors contract with out-of-state
corporations, which specialize in land and land rights buying, to conduct
negotiations with condemnees.58 Some protection against negotiation abuse is
available through contractual provisions which provide that an individual
landbuyer may be removed from the project within twenty-four hours of the
condemnor's request.5 9 The condemnor's liability for the acts of these cor-
porations is limited to actions performed within the scope of those corpora-
tions' authority. 60 Although these out-of-state landbuying corporations are
licensed by the state real estate board, the individuals employed by them may
not be licensed land brokers. 6'
One ever-increasing group of condemnors is public utility corporations.
Much of their land appropriation is for rights-of-way rather than a fee
simple. Here the Committee found an unique practice. The initial offer made
by the utility is based upon a lineal foot estimate of the cost of the entire pro-
ject.6 2 This practice ignores any consideration of the character or quality of
the specific parcel through which the right of way is being sought. Only if
such an offer is rejected by the landowner is an actual appraisal made of the
property. 
63
O~ne of the most frequent complaints of the landowners is the large at-
torney's fees they are forced to incur to insure that they receive adequate
compensation for their appropriated property. 6 4 Actual case histories
presented to the Committee revealed that it was common for a condemnee to
receive substantially more from a court award: than from the condemnor's
final offer;65 but much of this gain was lost through the expenditure of at-
57Minutes of July 27, 1976, supra note 54, at 2 (testimony of James L. -Cole). It is emphasiz-
ed that these rather extreme allegations were made by only one landowner, raising a possibility of
bias. A representative of the Association of Indiana Counties, however, reported on another emi-
nent domain project and charged that abusive negotiation tactics resulted in the premature death
of, or mental damage to, several condemnees. Id. at 2-3 (testimony of Paul Shaw).
58
Minutes of August 17, 1976, supra note 1,4, at 3.
59
1d.
vIa. One landowner charged that the condemnor seeking to appropriate her property
disclaimed all liability for the actions of the out-of-state landbuyers. Minutes of August 31, 1976,
supra note 54, at app. C (letter of Elizabeth Marshall).
61Minutes of August 17, 1976, supra note 54, at 3. Public Service Indiana regards its con-
tracted landbuyers as "mere harbingers of the offer," rather than land brokers.
6 Id. at 4.
631d.
4E.g., Minutes of August 31, 1976, supra note 54, at app. C; Minutes of August 17, 1976,
supra note 54, at app. A & B; Minutes of June 8, 1976, supra note 54, at 2-4.
65 0ne illustrative example is shown in Minutes of August 17, 1976, supra note 54, at app.
A (statement of William and Gloria Huey). This particular landowner has been forced to defend
four condemnation proceedings. The results were as follows:
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torney's fees. The condemnors understandably objected to any provision in
eminent domain laws for the reimbursement of those fees.
6 6
It is apparent from these independent investigations that the failure to
allow the recovery of attorney's fees gives the condemnor a distinct bargaining
advantage. The landowner is faced with a difficult choice. He knows, or the
condemnor will inform him, that unless he accepts the amount offered he will
incur substantial litigation expenses by proceeding to trial. The mere threat
of litigation has a coercive impact which, in some cases, forces a litigant to
succumb to that pressure rather than assert his rights. His decision will be
based upon his judgment as to how much he could reasonably receive from a
judicial determination of a fair amount. If the value of the property sought is
small, the condemnee will nearly always yield to the condemnor's offer and
accept a price below the true "just compensation.
67
Possible Remedies: The Experience in Various States
The most often asserted argument against any scheme to reimburse the
condemnee's attorney's fees is that it would increase the amount of litiga-
tion.6 8 Of course the relative merit of this argument will depend upon the
Final Offer Court Award Attorney's Fees Increase
1. $ 2,440 $ 4,886 $ 815 100%
2. 30,000 48,029.44 6,010 60%
3. 4,140 9,800 1,887 137%
4. 6,442 13,650 2,410 111%
Further, a representative of the State Highway Commission presented a summary of
highway land acquisition costs. In the period from 1965 to 1975:
1. There were 1,271 landtakings resulting in jury awards. The total appraised (or fair
market) value for these cases was $16.1 million, the actual amount paid to the lan-
downers was $34.4 million plus an additional $1.1 million in interest lost on amounts
on deposit in the courts. On the average, jury awards were 95% higher than the ap-
praised value.
2. There were 1,993 cases settled in court in which the average award was 30%
greater than the appraised value. The 1,993 cases had an appraised value of $18.1
million, and the highway department actually paid $23.4 million.
3. The voluntary land acquistions amounted to 13,645 cases in which the total
amount paid, $103 million, represented the total appraised value.
Minutes of August 31, 1976, supra note 54, at 4.
66Minutes of August 31, 1976, supra note 54, at 3-4; Minutes of August 17, 1976, supra
note 54, at 2-3.
67
Note, Attorney Fees as an Element of Just Compensation, 12 IowA L. REv. 286, 288
(1927); Comment, Eminent Domain: Attorney Fees in Condemnation-A Defense of the Penn-
sylvania Position, 77 DIcK. L. REv. 316, 330 (1973), where the author notes: "The no recovery
procedure forces settlement by intimidation, especially in small claim controversies, and patently
fails to encourage retention of counsel."
6
8E.g., Note, Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees in Arkansas Upon Dismissal of Condemna-
tion Proceedings, 22 ARK. L. REv. 181, 187 (1968); Comment, Eminent Domain: Attorney Fees
in Condemnation-A Defense of the Pennsylvania Position, 77 DICK. L. REv. 316, 325 (1973);
Hearings on S.1351, Jupra note 49, at 50-51.
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type of statutory scheme in effect. A statute that provided for full recovery of
attorney's fees to the condemnee regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit
would increase litigation since the landowner would have nothing to lose by
proceeding to court.6 9
The opposing argument is that the allowance of the recovery of attorney's
fees would actually reduce the amount of litigation because it would en-
courage the settlement of cases without trial. 70 This view assumes that by be-
ing faced with reimbursing the landowner for his attorney's fees if the case
goes to trial, the condemnor will excercise more care and seek a more ac-
curate appraisal before beginning negotiations. 7' It would also discourage any
deceitful bargaining tactics on the part of the negotiators.
In view of the oppressive negotiation tactics being used by condemnors,
the condemnee's need for greater bargaining power is apparent. Since the
courts continue to construe the "just compensation" clause as not encompass-
ing attorney's fees, the legislature must respond with a statutory scheme that
will equalize the bargaining power, and at the same time protect those con-
demnors who do make good faith offers. That the landowner's plight has
been recognized is shown by recent state and federal legislation which pro-
vides for the recovery of attorney's fees in -certain limited situations. In In-
diana, landowners who are forced to bring inverse condemnation actions,7 2 or
those against whom condemnation proceedings are abandoned, can recover
their reasonable attorney's fees. 73 The federal government has enacted similar
protection for condemnees in federal land acquisitions.
74
Various statutory schemes have been suggested or adopted by the several
states to equalize the bargaining power of the condemnor and condemnee by
allowing the recovery of attorney's fees. One approach, adopted in Florida, 75
is to allow recovery in all cases regardless of whether the litigation results in
an award greater than the condemnor's final offer before trial. Even though
"9For suggested ways to avoid this extreme result by placing appropriate restrictions in the
legislation, see notes 82-90 infra & text accompanying.
7°Foerster, A Look at Condemnation Attorney's Fees, 46 FLA. B.J. 130, 131 (1972). See also
Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining 'Just Compensation," 21 STAN. L. REV. 693, 699-701
(1969); Note, Attorneys' Fees in Ctondemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694, 705-06
(1969); Note, Attorney Fees as an Element of Just Compensation, 12 IowA L. REV. 286, 289-90
(1927); Hearings on S.1351, supra note 49, at 31, 33.
"Foerster, A Look at Condemnation Attorney's Fees, 46 FLA. B.J. 130, 131 (1972).
"
5
IND. CODE 32-11-1-12 (1976).
"State, Highway Comm'n v. Blackiston Land Co., Ind. App. , 301 N.E.2d 663
(1973); IND. CODE 32-11-1-12 (1976); IND. CODE 8-13-18.5-5-13 (1976).
7442 U.S.C. § 4654 (1973).
15"The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (West
Cum. Supp. 1976).
The Florida Supreme Court has suggested that even without this statutory authorization the
reimbursement of a condemnee's attorney's fees might be compelled by the "just compensation"
clause of the Florida Constitution. Jacsonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Dupree Co., 108
So.2d 289 (Fla. 1958).
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this approach would seem to be the one most likely to promote frivolous or
unjustified litigation, it does not appear to have had that effect in application
as demonstrated by the strong defense of the procedure by the Florida legal
community.
76
Another approach, adopted in North Dakota, 77 is to allow the recovery of
the landowner's attorney's fees at the discretion of the court. The trial judge
who hears the evidence would be in the best position to evaluate the merits of
the landowner's -case78 and could therefore assess the condemneee's attorney's
fees accordingly. In determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee
several factors are normally considered, such as "the amount and the
character of the services rendered, the results obtained, the customary charge
for the services rendered, and the ability and skill of the attorney."
79
While a discretionary approach would discourage vexatious lawsuits, it
does suffer from some defects. There might well be an adverse effect on in-
dependent advocacy if the attorney's compensation depends upon the pure
whim of the.judge before whom he argues. In one state which has adopted a
discretionary scheme for all civil cases, the avalanche of appeals has become
so great that the state bar association has passed a resolution calling for a
repeal of the enabling legislation."0
16Note, Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694, 706, nn.79 &
80 (1969). See Foerster, A Look at Condemnation Attorney's Fees, 46 FLA. B.J. 130 (1972).
At the appellate level, however, the reimbursement of the landowner's attorney's fees is
limited to those cases where he prevails. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.131(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1976)
provides: "The petitioner shall pay all reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court, ex-
cept upon an appeal taken by a defendant in which the judgment of the trial court shall be af-
firmed."
'IN. D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (1975) provides:
The court may in its discretion award to the defendant reasonable actual or
statutory costs or both, which may include interest from the time of taking except in-
terest on the amount of a deposit which is available for withdrawl without prejudice to
right of appeal, costs on appeal, and reasonable attorney's fees for all judicial pro-
ceedings. If the defendant appeals and does not prevail, the costs on appeal may be
taxed against him. In all cases when a new trial has been granted upon the application
of the defendant and he has failed upon such trial to obtain greater compensation
than was allowed him upon the first trial, the costs of such new trial shall be taxed
against him.
Michigan has also adopted a discretionary reimbursement plan, but any hope of its being
effective is illusory since the recovery of attorney's fees is limited to $25 maximum. See MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. 5 213.37 (1967)..
78"The court is an expert on which is reasonable. The trial judge before whom the action
was tried had knowledge of the character of the litigation, the preparation and skill of the
presentation, and the results obtained; and could make appraisal of the reasonable value of ser-
vices rendered. Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'r v. Wetsch, 142 N.W.2d 751, 753
(N.D. 1966). See also Note, Attorneys'Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694,
715 (1969).
"United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439, 446 (N.D. 1965). The
allowance made by the trial court is not reversed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion
is shown. Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381, 392 (N.D. 1973).
sComment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs.
L. REv. 129, 130, 145 (1974). ALAS. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in part:
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Recognizing that the appraisal of property is not an exact science,8 1 a
statutory scheme could contain a built-in degree of latitude requiring the
judicial determination of just compensation to exceed the condemning
authority's final offer by a fixed amount or percentage before requiring the
reimbursement of attorney's fees. For example, in Alaska the landowner is
allowed to recover his attorney's fees only if the court award is at least ten
percent greater than the amount previously made available to him.8 2 From
the landowner's standpoint, the fairness of this approach depends upon the
value of the property appropriated. If the value is small, such as where the
condemning authority is taking only a right-of-way, the slight loss to the
owner (potentially ten percent in Alaska) might be worth the benefit of
discouraging frivolous litigation. But in today's market the ever-increasing
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party as Costs.
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following schedule of
attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the party recovering
any money judgment therein, as part of the costs of the action allowed by
law:
Attorney's,.Fees in Average Cases
Contested Without Trial Non-Contested
First $2,000 25% 20% 15%
Next $3,000 20% 15% 12.5%
Next $5,000 15% 12.5% 10%
Over $10,000 10% 7.5% 5%
Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party may be fixed
by the court as a part of the costs of the action, in its discretion, in a reasonable
amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria for deter-
mining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court shall award a fee com-
mensurate with the amount and value of legal services rendered.
(3) The allowance of attorney's fees by the court in conformance wjth the
foregoing schedule is not to be construed as fixing the fees between attorney and
client.
It may well be that the huge number of appeals.on the issue of attorney's fees is caused by the
statutory guidelines of Rule 82, as well as the trial judge's exercise of discretion. It has been sug-
gested that a requirement that the judge give articulated grounds for his determination of the fee
award would reduce the nunrber of appeals and deter abuse of discretion. Comment, After
Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. RFxv. 267, 300 (1976).
"
1
See note 53 supra & text accompanying.
82
"Costs and attorney's fees incurred by the defendant shall not be assessed against the
plaintiff, unless: . . . (2) the award of the court was at least ten (10) percent larger than the
amount deposited by the condemning authority or the allowance of the master from which an
appeal was taken, .... " ALAS. R. Civ. P. 72 (k).
While this is the general statutory scheme for reimbursement of attorney's fees in eminent
domain proceedings, the judge is given further discretion to allow attorney's fees where "necessary
to achieve a just and adequate compensation of the owner." Id. at 72 (k)(4). It is noteworthy that
Rule 72 was not cited in Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82,
4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 129 (1974) for causing the great number of appeals, as were the por-




value of land coupled with a ten percent margin of "appraisal error" could
result in a substantial loss to the condemnee.
8 3
A final approach to the statutory allowance of attorney's fees is to allow it
in all cases, but limited to a fixed amount. This is the practice now followed
in Pennsylvania, with the maximum allowance fixed at $500.84 This com-
promise measure falls far short of making the landowner "whole" since it is
meant to cover not only attorney's fees, but also appraisal and engineering
fees.85 Clearly, a small statutory limit on recovery of attorney's fees, like the
$500 ceiling in Pennsylvania, amounts to no more than dangling a carrot in
from the condemnee. With today's cost of legal services it is the rare case
where such a small amount would cover the cost of attorney's fees in a con-
demnation case, to say nothing about expert witness fees and other expenses
of litigation.86 If a statutory limit is to be imposed, the least that could be ex-
"3For example, if a house and lot worth $50,000 were being taken, the landowner would
have to be reasonably assured of increasing the award more than $5,000 before it would be worth
his while to go to trial. Yet this is a substantial amount from the homeowner's point of view, and
in the case of commercial urban property the result would be even more extreme. Of course this
could be avoided by reducing the allowable margin of error to 2-5%. Even though it might be
said that this small a percentage could lead to the quibbling, and possible litigation, over small
sums of money in the case of low-valued property, it seems unlikely that a condemnee would be
willing to invest the time and incidental expenses (travel, loss of wages, etc.) necessary for a full
trial over such sums.
84"The owner of any right, title, or interest in real property acquired or injured by an ac-
quiring agency . . . shall be reimbursed in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500)
as a payment toward reasonable expenses actually incurred for appraisal, attorney and engineer-
ing fees." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-610 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
Pennsylvania provides for full recovery of these fees where the landowner successfully
challenges the condemnor's right to appropriate the property or procedures followed by the con-
demnor, where the condemnation is revoked by the condemnor, and where the condemnee is
forced to bring an inverse condemnation proceeding. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-406(e), 1-408,
and 1-609 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
It is said that this procedure encourages the condemnee to seek legal and other expert ad-
vico and, thus, enables him to make an informed decision as to the adequacy of the condemning
authority's offer. It is also believed that this procedure will encourage settlement because the con-
demnor will increase his offer since he is aware that the condemnee will not hesitate to proceed
to trial secure in the knowledge that his attorney's fees will be reimbursed. Comment, Eminent
Domain: Attorney Fees in Condemnation-A Defense of the Pennsylvania Position, 77 DICK. L.
REV. 316, 327-28 (1973)K
Critics of the statutory limitation plan believe there is no need for a ceiling on the recovery
of attorney's fees because the courts, on the whole, properly exercise their discretion in determin-
ing reasonable fees. Since the judge will limit recovery to a reasonable fee, only a foolish attorney
would unnecessarily take the time of the court. Thus, it is believed that a statutory limit on at-
torney's fees would both encourage unecessary litigation and increase the cost of land acquisition
since the court would fix fees according to that limitation. Foerster, A Look at Condemnation
Attorney's Fees, 46 FLA. B.J. 130, 132-33 (1972). The determination of a reasonable attorney's
fee is guided by the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. CANON 2, DISCIPLINARY RULE No.
2-106.
85PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-610 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
61For some examples of attorney's fees held to have been reasonable in eminent domain
cases, see Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 201, § 6 (1974); 56 A.L.R.2d 13, § 64 (1957); 2 S. SPEISER. AT.
TORNETY'S'FEEs § 14:135 (1973). See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 475 (1974) (Amount of Attorney's
Compensation in Absence of Contract or Statute Fixing Amount).
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pected is that it be a realistic one. But with the great variance of attorney's
fees actually incurred, because of the difference in complexity and value of
the property of each case, it is submitted that no statutorily limited reim-
bursement scheme will succeed in making a landowner "whole" in every case.
Possible Remedies: Uniform Codes for Eminent Domain
The effectiveness of many of the state-enacted schemes has been
diluted, as shown previously, by the limits placed on reimbursement by the
adopting legislature. An even greater exercise in futility was a proposed draft
of a Model Eminent Domain Code prepared by the Committee on Condem-
nation Law of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association. 7 Under section 504E the condemnee may be
allowed to recover his attorney's fees if the court award exceeds the condem-
nor's offer, but only where nonallowance would "invoke serious hardship" on
the condemnee.88 While section 504E might encourage fairer offers by the
condemnor to avoid incurring litigation expenses, any effectiveness of this
provision is destroyed by requiring a finding of "serious hardship" before per-
mitting reimbursement.8 9 It is difficult to give any real meaning to such a
term. A court would most likely look for a serious financial hardship to trig-
ger the award of attorney's fees. This would lead to the unjustifiable result
that in simlar cases a poor condemnee could recover his attornery's fees while
a wealthy condemnee would be denied recovery. The condemning authority
could continue to use unscrupulous bargaining tactics in dealing with a
wealthy condemnee because of the prerequisite "serious hardship."9
In response to the criticism of antiquated eminent domain laws, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has recommend-
ed a proposed solution, adoption of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code.
Several provisions have been suggested that would tend to curb oppressive
bargaining practices by the condemning authority. 9' In addition, provision is
"Reprinted in 2 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 365 (1967).
"
8
MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 504E provides:
Where the ultimate award is more than the offer of the condemnor, the Trial Judge
shall have the authority to cause the condemnor to reimburse the [condemnee] . .. for
its attorney's fees and other reasonable expense, but his authority shall exist only in
those instances where the trial judge finds affirmatively that to do otherwise would in-
voke serious hardship on the condemnee.
89
Note, Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694, 710-11
(1969).
9
For a discussion of the effect of § 504E in inverse condemnation and abandonment pro-
ceedings, see Id. at 711-12.
"
1
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 203(a) provides:
Before initiating negotiations for the purchase of property, the condemnor shall
establish an amount which it believes to be just compensation therefor and promptly
shall submit to the owner an offer to acquire the property for the full amount so
established. The amount shall not be less than the condemnor's approved appraisal of
just compensation for the property.
In addition, § 207 provides:
[Vol. 52:813
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made for the recovery of litigation expenses where the court award exceeds
the condemnor's offer.
The recovery of attorney's fees is dependent upon a formal offer of settle-
ment. Pursuant to section 708 either party may file and serve on the other
party an offer of settlement shortly before trial.9 2 If the defendant landowner
makes an offer under section 708, and it is rejected by the condemning
authority, he will be reimbursed for his attorney's fees subject to the limita-
tions of section 1205, which provides:
(a) If the judgment determines that the plaintiff has the right to take all
or part of the defendant's property, the costs incurred by the defendant shall
be claimed, taxed, and allowed to the defendant by the same procedure as in
ther civil actions, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) If the amount of compensation awarded to the defendant by the
judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is equal to or greater than the
amount specified in the last offer of settlement made by the defendant under
Section 708, the court shall allow the defendant his costs under subsection (a)
and in addition his litigation expenses in an amount not exceeding the
greater of [ ] dollars or [25] percent of the amount by which the com-
pensation awarded exceeds the amount of the plaintiff's last offer of settle-
ment made under Section 203 or 708.
[(c) If the amount of compensation awarded to the defendant by the
judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is equal to or less than the amount
specified in the last offer of settlement made by the plaintiff under Section
708, the defendant shall not be entitled to his costs incurred after the date of
service of the offer.] 93
In order to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the property, a con-
demnor may not advance the time of condemnation, defer negotiations or condemna-
tion and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the owner, nor take any other ac-
tion coercive in nature.
"
2
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 708 provides:
(a) Not less than [ten] days before the trial on the issue of the amount of com-
pensation, either party may file and serve on the other party an offer of settlement,
and within [five] days thereafter the party served may respond by filing and serving his
offer of settlement. The offer shall state that it is made under this section and specify
the amount, exclusive of interest and costs, which the party serving the offer is willing
to agree is just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The offer supersedes
any offer previously made under this section by the same party.
(b) An offer of settlement is deemed rejected unless an acceptance in writing is
filed and served on the party making the offer, before the commencement of the trial
on the issue of the amount of compensation.
(c) If the offer is rejected, it may not be referred to for any purpose at the trial,
but may be considered solely for the purpose of awarding costs and litigation expenses
under Section 1205.
(d) This section does not limit or restrict the right of a defendant to payment of
any amounts authorized by law in addition to compensation for the property taken
from him.
"Id. § 1205. "Subsection (c), however, is in brackets to indicate that it should be omitted if
a withholding of costs in the adopting state would violate state constitutional requirements."
UNIFORM EM.NENT DOIAIN CODE § 1205, Comment. In addition, the Code provides for full
recovery of litigation expenses in inverse condemnation proceedings and where the condemnation
action is wholly or partially dismissed. Id. §§ 213 & 1305. See also 1 NICHOLS'. supra note 3, at §
4.109 [1].
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The term "litigation expenses" is defined as "the sum of the costs,
disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and





Section 1205 has been hailed as a "salutory provision for encouraging set-
tlements."95 This praise may be a bit premature. The burden is placed on the
defendant landowner to qualify for a possible reimbursement of litigation ex-
penses by the requirement of an offer of settlement pursuant to section 708.
The condemnee is thus forced to make a tough decision. If he makes such an
offer and the award of the court is less than that amount, even though it may
be greater than any offer made by the condemning authority, the condemnee
will not recover his litigation expenses. For example, assume that the con-
demnor's final offer is $20,000 and the condemnee offers to settle for $30,000
under section 708. If the court award is $28,000, the condemnee will not
recover his litigation expenses, even though the judicially determined "just
compensation" is 40 percent greater than -the condemnor's final offer.
Because of this, the condemnee might tend to make his offer under sec-
tion 708 lower than what he justifiably believes to be "just compensation" in
order to insure that he will receive his litigation expenses. He is forced to
gamble as to how much lower to make such an offer because he faces the risk
of the condemning authority accepting his offer, with the result that in the
end he will receive less than just compensation.
It appears that there is no justifiable reason for placing the burden of
making this kind of decision on the defendant landowner. Although there are
exceptions, the studies and investigations conducted to date96 show that more
often than not the necessity of litigation of the issue of just compensation is
caused by substantially low offers on the part of the condemning authority
rather than the obstinacy of the landowner.
The effectiveness of section 1205 as a techinque of encouraging settlement
will further depend upon the dollar amount and percentage figure inserted
by the adopting state legislature.9 7 If these figures are small the Uniform
Code will fall far short of insuring that the condemnee receives "just compen-
sation."98 In addition, if the ceiling on reimbursement is low the condemnor
might well be willing to gamble on having to pay the landowner's litigation
expenses, and persist in making low offers to attempt to coerce the con-
demnee into a low settlement. If the attempt failed, and the condemnee
prevailed at trial, the small reimbursement the condemnor is forced to make
"Id. § 103(14).
9 Committee on Condemnation Law of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association, Uniform Eminent Domain Code-A Review, 10 REAL PROP.
PROB. AND TR. J. 614, 620 (1975), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE. REAL ESTATE CONDEM-
NATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW TRENDS 527, 535 (1976).
"See text accompanying notes 39-67 supra.
97The brackets in § 1205(b) are to indicate that the adopting state legislature may insert
the figures it deems appropriate.
98See notes 84-86 supra & text accompanying.
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would be considered only an additional "cost of doing business." Such a gam-
ble would be justified from the condemnor's standpoint if the attempt suc-
ceeded more often than it failed.
Possible Remedies: The Indiana Approach
The Eminent Domain Study Committe of the Indiana Legislative Council
has proposed the adoption of provisions patterned after sections 708 and
1205. 99 The provision for offer of settlement, section 24, does not materially
differ from section 708 of the Uniform Code.' 00 The provision dealing with
recoverable costs, section 25, closely follows section 1205 of the Uniform
Code.' 0' The material portion, however, is section 25(b), which provides:
"Suggested* Legislation, supra note 55, at 7-8. Several bills were introduced in the 1977 ses-
sion of the Indiana General Assembly that would have revised Indiana eminent domain law. In-
dianapolis Star, Jan. 9, 1977, § 4 (City & State), at 1, col. 4. Initially it was felt that only the
bills that provided for a uniform notice of offer and landowner's rights, H.B. 1300, and a conve-
nience and necessity permit as a prerequisite to condemnation by public utilites, H.B. 1302,
would be given serious consideration. Letter from Hon. John J. Thomas, Speaker Pro Tem, In-
diana House of Representative, to Byron Myers (Jan. 14, 1975) [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOUR.
NAL]. Cf. note 108 infra.
"I Sec. 24. Offer of Settlement. (a) Not less than ten days before the trial on the
amount of damages and benefits, either party may file and serve on the other party an
offer of settlement, and within five days thereafter the party served may respond by fil-
ing and serving his offer of settlement. The offer shall state that it is made under this
section and specify the amount, exclusive of interest and costs, which the party serving
the offer is willing to agree is just compensation and damages for the property sought
to be taken. The offer supersedes any offer previously made under this section by the
same party.
(b) An offer of settlement is deemed rejected unless an acceptance in writing is
filed and served on the party making the offer, before the commencement of the trial
on the issue of the amount of damages and benefits.
(c) If the offer is rejected, it may not be referred to for any purpose at the trial,
but may be considered solely for the purpose of awarding costs and litigation expenses
under section 25 of this chapter.
(d) This section does not limit or restrict the right of a defendant to payment of
any amounts authorized by law in addition to compensation for the property taken
from him.
Suggested Legislation, supra note 55, at 7.
I Sec. 25. Recoverable Costs. (a) If the judgment determines that the plaintiff
has the right to take all or part of the defendant's property, the costs incurred by the
defendant shall be claimed, taxed, and allowed to the defendant by the same pro-
cedure as in other civil actions, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) If the amount of benefits and damages awarded to the defendant by the
judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is equal to or greater than the amount
specified in the last offer of settlement made by the defendant under section 24 of this
chapter, the court shall allow the defendant his costs under subsection (a) and in addi-
tion his litigation expenses in an amount not exceeding the greater of one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount by which the compensa-
tion awarded exceeds the amount of the plaintiffs last offer of settlement made under
section 24 of this chapter.
(c) If the amount of damages and benefits awarded to the defendant by the
judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is equal to or less than the amount specified
in the last offer of settlement made by the plaintiff under section 24 of this chapter,
the defendant shall not be entitled to his costs incurred after the date of service of the
offer.
Suggested Legislation, supra note 55, at 8.
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(b) If the amount of benefits and damages awarded to the defendant by
the judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is equal to or greater than the
amount specified in the last offer of settlement made by the defendant under
section 24 of this chapter, the court shall allow the defendant his costs under
subsection (a) and in addition his litigation expenses in an amount not ex-
ceeding the greater of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or twenty-five percent
(25%) of the amount by which the compensation awarded exceeds the amount
of the plaintiffs last offer of settlement made under section 24 of this
chapter. 102
This proposal does not provide the protection intended or needed. The
offer of settlement under section 24 is discretionary on the part of either par-
ty.' 0 3 By failing to make such an offer the condemning authority would, in
effect, be placing a $1,000 limit on any possible reimbursement of litigation
expenses. As previously discussed,10 4 this figure is wholly inadequate in view
of today's cost of legal services and the litigation expenditures routinely incur-
red in condemnation proceedings. Even if the condemnor does make an offer
under section 24 he could still limit any possible reimbursement by making
an offer only slightly below the amount the condemnee reasonably believes to
be "just compensation." For example, if the condemnor offers $25,000 where
the condemnee believes the correct amount should be $30,000, and the court
award is actually determined to be $30,000, the condemnee will be limited to
a $1,250 recovery of litigation expenses under section 25(b). This could have
the coercive effect of inducing the condemnee to accept the $25,000 offer
rather than gamble upon what his litigation expenses might be at trial.
PROPOSED SOLUTION
The legislation proposed by the Indiana Eminent Domain Study Commit-
tee, with appropriate amendments, could be an effective deterrent against
condemnor oppression. By following the format of the Uniform Eminent Do-
main Code it would tie in well with other revisions of the eminent domain
law patterned after the uniform act. 05
It is suggested that sections 24 and 25 be amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Offer of Settlement. (a) Not less than 10 days before the trial on
the amount of damages and benefits, the condemnor shall file and serve on
the condemnee an offer of settlement, and within five days thereafter the
condemnee shall respond by filing and serving his offer of settlement.
0 6
Sec. 25. Recoverable Costs. (b) If the amount of benefits and damages
awarded to the condemnee by the judgment, exclusive of interest and costs, is
102d. (emphasis added).
"'See Section 24(a), note 100, supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
"'See note 99 supra.




greater than the amount specified in the last offer of settlement made by the
condemnor under section 24 of this chapter, the court shall allow the con-
demnee his costs under subsection (a) and in addition his litigation ex-
penses. 07
The above amendments would prove advantageous in several ways. By
making a formal offer by the condemnor mandatory under section 24 it
would force one final consideration of the previous offers made by him and a
cost benefit analysis could be made of the anticipated expenses of litigation
against the likely award at trial to determine if meeting the condemnee's
demands might be the better course.'10 Since the condemnee will recover his
litigation expenses if the court award exceeds the condemnor's final offer it
would eliminate the use of coercive and intimidating negotiation tactics by
equalizing the bargaining position of the parties. The elimination of the re-
quirement of an offer of settlement by the landowner under section 24 in
order to trigger the application of the recovery of costs provisions of section
25 avoids the landowner's dilemma of fixing the amount of his offer of set-
tlement,' 0 9 and places the burden of insuring that a fair offer is made on the
condemning authority where it rightfully belongs." 0
Even with the suggested changes the condemnor is still protected where
he has acted in good faith since the landowner will not be allowed to recover
his litigation expenses unless the court award exceeds the condemnor's final
offer. That, in itself, would discourage the condemnee from instituting un-
necessary and frivilous litigation. Moreover, settlement would be further en-
couraged by the fact that the definition of "litigation expenses" limits
recovery to "reasonable" attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees."'
'1"Subsections (a) and (c) would remain the same as in the proposed draft, see note 101
supra.
0'If the condemnee's demand is not much greater than the condemnor's final offer it
might be more feasible, from a public fiscal standpoint, to'accede to that demand rather than
litigate the issue.
While the bills for the reform of eminent domain law introduced in the current session of
the Indiana General Assembly, note 99 supra, initially made no provision for the reimbursement
of attorney's fees, an amendment was later proposed similar to that suggested by the Eminent
Domain Study Committee. See notes 99-102 supra & text accompanying. Under that proposed
amendment the offer of settlement, see note 100 supra, would be mandatory on the part of the
plaintiff condemnor. The proposed amendment's provision dealing with recoverable costs, note
101 supra, retained the "$1,000 or 25%" limitation. Letter from Hon. John J. Thomas, Speaker
Pro Tem, Indiana House of Representatives, to Byron Myers (Feb. 10, 1977) [on file at the IN-
DIANA LAW JOURNAL]. A revised version of this proposed amendment was subsequently incor-
porated into H.B. 1300, which was signed into law by the Governor on May 3, 1977. As finally
adopted, if the award at trial exceeds the plaintiff condemnor's mandatory offer of settlement the
defendant landowner shall be allowed to recover his litigation expenses, but only in an amount
not to exceed $2,500. See IND. CODE § 32-11-1-10 (Supp. 1977). Although the statute as enacted is
an improvement over previous law, the $2,500 limitation is still subject to the criticisms directed
against any fixed-fee reimbursement plan. See notes 84-86 supra & text accompanying.
'19See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
"'See note 94 supra.
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Through the use of accepted standards' 1 2 the trial judge could use this limita-
tion to discourage the unnecessary accumulation of evidence and other such
tactics to prevent any advantage being taken of the plaintiff, and to measure
the true value of an attorney's services." 3 By making the condemnee's offer
under section 24 mandatory, the trial judge, after hearing the evidence, will
be able to pass upon the reasonableness of the landowner's demands before
trial and can use this as a factor in determining the "reasonable" litigation
expenses that should be reimbursed. This would force the landowner to make
a good faith offer before trial.
Admittedly, there may be a few cases where the court awards a judgment
only slightly larger than the condemnor's offer with the result that the con-
demning authority is forced to incur the landowner's litigation expenses in
spite of a good faith offer. But experience has not shown this to be the usual
result." 4 Since statutory draftsmarfship can never achieve a perfect result in
every case, it is better to resolve such a situation in favor of the landowner
who is being forced to give up his property for public use. True, the sug-
gested amendments might slightly increase the total cost of land acquisitions;
however, the condemning authority is in the best position to spread such in-
creased costs through the use of the taxing power or user charges, over the
public as a whole who, after all, is the group that is to be benefited from the
appropriation of the property. This small burden is more than outweighed by
the need to truly give the condemnee what the Indiana and United States
Constitutions command- "just compensation."
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain proceedings are distinctively different from other civil
litigation. The defendant landowner has neither intentionally or negligently
inflicted any harm on another, nor failed to perform any agreement. He is in
court only because a condemning authority has decided to take his property
and convert it to a public use. For this the state and federal constitutions de-
"' A good example of such objective factors is found in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.092 (West
Cum. Supp. 1976) which provides:
In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall consider:
(1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered.
(2) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the question involved.
(3) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
(4) The amount of money involved.
(5) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
(6) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the
client.
However, under no circumstances shall the attorney's fees be based solely on a percen-
tage of the award.
"'One of the factors considered in valuing the attorney's services is the increase in the court
award over the condemnor's final offer.
" 4See notes 39-67 supra & text accompanying.
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mand that he be put in as good a position financially as if his property had
not been taken.
The unscrupulous bargaining tactics of condemnors revealed by recent in-
vestigations cannot be condoned or ignored. Since the courts have been
unresponsive to the condemnee's plight, the task falls upon the legislatures to
halt the coercion and intimidation of landowners that is prevalent in the
negotiation stage. This can be done with appropriate legislation with only a
slight increase, if any, in the cost of land acquisitions.
It is submitted that the only way to put the condemnee on an equal
bargaining plane with the condemnor is to provide for the full reimbursement
of his attorney's fees in all cases where the court award exceeds the condem-
nor's final offer. In this way the condemnor will be encouraged to make
fairer offers and will be discouraged from following oppressive negotiation
practices. Protection is afforded the condemnor by limiting the recovery to
reasonable attorney's fees. Since the results of the litigation, i.e. the dif-
ference between the court award and the condemnor's final offer, is one of
the objective factors to be considered in determining a reasonable fee, an un-
duly large amount spent for only a small gain would not always justify the
full reimbursement of attorney's fees. This problem may not surface often
since the average condemnee will not be willing to invest the time and in-
cidental expense necessary to attend a trial where it appears that even if he
prevails the award would likely be only slightly larger than the condemnor's
offer.
BYRON L. MYERS
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